Since 1951 the ministry of transport has been vested with sweeping authority to restrict entry and set prices in commercial trucking. Perhaps it could have used this authority to cartelize the industry. The weight of evidence holds that it did not do so. There is little to suggest that the standard price schedules which the MOT continues to publicize and periodically revise are anything more than suggestions, widely disregarded by commercial trucking firms. There are no economies or diseconomies of scale and firms have expanded until industry profits are exhausted. The changes in truck transport regulation introduced in 1991 were mainly directed at freeing a new activity, parcel delivery service, from regulatory constraints, and spreading some of the benefits to others in the industry. The principle remaining effect of truck transport regulation in Japan has been to impose a cost on private trucking operations (companies that use their own trucks to deliver their own merchandise) by legally barring them from also undertaking commercial business. If this restraint were to be lifted, the supply of trucking services would be enlarged and in the transition to a new (zero profit) equilibrium commercial truckers would suffer losses and some would exit.
Introduction.
The Japanese trucking industry nicely epitomizes a curious aspect of regulation in Japan: Although many have remarked on the ubiquity, intrusiveness and inefficiency of government regulation in Japan, one searches nearly in vain for economic analyses of the actual effects of regulation in Japan. From 1951 the Ministry of Transport was vested with sweeping authority to restrict entry and regulate prices in the trucking industry. Yet in spite of the annual flood of government reports on the industry's production, operating characteristics, and so on, there exist no estimates of how the performance of the industry might have been different in the absence of regulation. Contrast with the US is stark.
A voluminous academic literature established that Interstate Commerce Commission restrictions on entry and pricing had effectively cartelized the trucking industry (from 1935 to 1980) , and, as it turns out, accurately predicted the effects of deregulation on industry capital values and labor earnings. Since 1991 the trucking industry of Japan has been subject to a revised set of regulations which nominally represent relaxation of government restraints on entry and pricing. Yet just as the effects of the original regulatory regime were unknown, so too the effects of change in regime remain unplumbed. The goal of this study is to analyze the effects of regulation (and 1991 changes in regulation) on prices and rents in Japan's trucking industry. What we discover is that truck transport regulation in Japan has not been nearly as costly, distorting, and intrusive as it was in the US.
Regulation has not produced a sweeping cartelization of truck transport in Japan, as it did in the US. The changes in truck transport regulation introduced in 1991 were mainly directed at freeing a new activity, parcel delivery service, from regulatory constraints, and spreading some of the benefits to others in the industry. The principle remaining effect of truck transport regulation in Japan has been to impose a cost on private trucking operations (companies that use their own trucks to deliver their own merchandise) by legally barring them from also undertaking commercial business. Commercial truckers have expanded their own operations until industry profits are exhausted. The end result is a system in which private truckers undertake less commercial business than is economically efficient and commercial truckers undertake more. Further relaxation of truck transport regulation in Japan would reduce the number of empty trucks on the roadways there but would not lead to a significant reduction in fares.
One of the keys to analysis of Japan's truck transport industry is its absence of economies of scale, which below we document with estimates of cost functions. The picture that emerges is an industry in which rents are exhausted, subject to the regulatory constraints. When parcel delivery service rapidly developed in the 1980's and the regulatory constraints began to impose large and visible deadweight costs, the competition among political pressure groups forced a change, just as Becker's (1983) theory anticipated. And as Peltzman's (1976) theory anticipated, in the movement from one political equilibrium to another, the benefits got spread among pressure groups, not concentrated solely on one.
2. Trucking regulations of Japan.
Regulation of truck transport in Japan originated during the Occupation era.
The Railway Express Enterprise Law of 1949 established price and entry regulation of the trucking services connected with rail shipments. The Road Transportation Law of 1951 divided remaining commercial trucking firms into two categories, route truckers and area truckers.
Route truckers were licensed to serve particular routes on regular timetables, and were permitted to serve customers on a less than truckload basis. That is multiple shipments could be combined on the same truck. The area truckers were licensed to serve one customer at a time on consignment within a designated region. That is they were permitted to offer shipments on a full truckload basis only. Besides these, specialized vehicles such as refrigerator trucks, tank trucks, and hearses are in a distinct category but their numbers are small in comparison to the others. Amendments to the laws in 1971 abolished the distinction between area truckers and those offering services connected with rail shipments, leaving intact the distinction between area truckers and route truckers. system. Under the new system, the firms formerly holding route trucking licenses were no longer required to adhere to fixed time schedules nor make pickups and deliveries at pre-set locations. Parcels could now be picked up and delivered at the customers' own premises rather than only at dropsites stipulated in MOT licenses-the troublesome feature of the earlier regime which elicited effective political opposition to it. The new permits specify geographic regions of operation but the companies specializing in parcel delivery hold in effect nation-wide coverage of permits. Additionally, the former holders of area trucking licenses now have been issued permits that allow them to combine shipments of differing customers (less-than-truckload shipments). In principle the permits now held by route trucking firms and area trucking firms no longer differ. However, there does still exist a de-facto distinction between the two types of firms. Long distance shipping including parcel delivery is mainly confined to the firms with networks of terminals. These, the former holders of route trucking licenses, are still referred to in the industry and in government surveys as the "less-than-truckload" companies (tokubetsu tsumiawase) . The others, including mostly former holders of area licenses, are referred to as "general" trucking firms (ippan).
A significant portion of truck transport in Japan has always been for private use and therefore not regulated. Many large companies in Japan deliver their own merchandise rather than hiring the services of commercial truckers.
Private trucks account for nearly two thirds of goods shipped by truck in Japan, by weight, but account for only about one fourth of shipments measured by tonkilometers (See means that all applicants meeting a set of published criteria will now be allowed entry, whereas before, the MOT was authorized to bar entry or bar expansion of service by incumbents, more or less arbitrarily. There does exist some fudge wording in the 1989 Law authorizing the MOT to bar further entry if it deems that "competition is excessive", but so far it has not invoked this clause. The published criteria for obtaining a permit include minimum truck fleet sizes, ranging from 3 trucks to 15 trucks (These vary among the 10 MOT regional offices), with the added stipulation that the trucks are owned rather than leased. Also, there are stipulations regarding adequate office facilities, parking, employment of qualified personnel and so on.
In the case of area trucking all this might actually represent a hardening of entry regulation rather than softening. In any event, expansion by incumbents is likely to have exhausted whatever rents are conferred by restriction of new entry. As we document below, the industry does not exhibit economies of scale so expansion by incumbents is no more costly than new entry. And expansion by incumbents under both the old regime and the current one has often not required the issuance of new licenses or permits.
The factor which precipitated enactment of the 1989 Law was growth of the parcel delivery service. The transport ministry does not report income from parcel delivery separately from that of other commercial truckers but (as noted by Saitou, 1991, p. 45) Refer for example to the following: Goto and Sugiyama (1983) ; Sugiyama (1989); Takahashi (1990); and Takeuchi and Terada (1995) . the number of parcels delivered by route truckers doubled (See table 4).
Assuming, rather conservatively, that revenue per parcel was unchanged from the 655 yen/parcel received in 1985, this would mean that in 1990 parcel delivery accounted for nearly 40% of the operating income of less-than-truckload truckers and nearly 7 percent of the operating income of all truckers. In the last ten years, parcel delivery service has been by far the most rapidly growing segment of commercial trucking.
The growth of parcel delivery service in Japan mirrored the expansion of Federal Express and United Parcel Service in the US. In Japan, Yamato unyu (takkyuu-bin) was the innovator and it retains its dominance of the industry.
Yamato and its three subsidiaries accounted for 44.3% of parcel deliveries in 1993 followed by nippon tsuun (perikan-bin) and its 22 related companies with 26.2%. The Yamato logo, a black cat carrying its kitten in its mouth, has become a very familiar sight on trucks all over Japan. another ("value-added networks"). Within a few years, these innovations were imitated by nittsuu and others. The improvement in logistics and communications which these innovations supported, had made it cost effective to greatly increase the number of dropsites on truck routes, and to offer customers assurances of special handling or express delivery.
By 1985, parcel delivery service was becoming a major rival to postal parcel delivery service and had virtually displaced parcel shipment by rail. But the regulation of route trucking was ill suited to the new activity in several ways.
First, the route licenses bound the trucks to specified stops, often at retail ''The excellent little book by Saitou (1991) , describes these innovations in detail.
stores such as rice shops or liquor stores, while the new technology had made it economical to offer door-to-door pick-up and delivery. Second, even Yamato, the holder of the most kilometers of licensed routes was still unable to offer nationwide parcel delivery without further acquisition of licenses or subcontracting out to firms that already held licenses.
And finally, the standard pricing schedules of the MOT were poorly adapted to parcels as small as those the route truckers were now transporting-the sensible way of pricing parcel delivery was by the item, not by weight.
From 1983 to 1988 Yamato greatly expanded its network by acquiring other route companies to obtain their licenses, and by obtaining new licenses, but it was frustrated in its attempts to achieve truly nationwide coverage. In particular, in Yamagata prefecture, incumbent holders of route licenses successfully opposed Yamato's application to obtain licenses there (Saitou, 1991; pp. 141-147) . Only the enactment of the 1989 Act resolved matters in Yamato's favor, and at the same instant it largely removed the other onerous regulatory constraints on parcel delivery service also-at least this was true for Yamato.
A couple of other occurrences, germane to the expansion of parcel delivery service in Japan also merit comment. About 1988 the American company Federal
Express sought and obtained permission to deliver parcels to Japan and deliver them within Japan. The granting of these rights to FedEx had been requested by the US government with clear linkage to the ongoing trade negotiations. 5 Foreign pressure to relax regulatory constraints on parcel delivery were thus added to domestic pressure.
And finally, in February 1992 the president and other top officials of Tokyo Sagawa kyuubin were arrested and charged with extending fraudulent loans of more than 30-billion yen (more than 200-million $US) to affiliates of the Inagawa crime syndicate. The money was being funnelled to 100 politicians in the Liberal Democratic Party, including S. Kanemaru, the head of a leading faction. It was subsequently reported that among the intended objects of the bribery was the 5 On the chronology of Federal Expresses attempts to gain these concessions refer to Ligon (1993) . successful disposition of Sagawa's application to greatly expand its licensed area.
Sagawa's parcel delivery service remains quite minor relative to the industry leaders. This leads directly to a fundamental question regarding the effects of truck transport regulation: Has it produced a stream of economic rents? The answer is a resounding: maybe, but not a very large stream.
3. Evidence of economic rent.
One of the most convincing demonstrations that US trucking regulation generated cartel rents was that permits themselves were bought and sold at sizeable prices, about a third of the amount of annual revenue generated by the business which the permit allowed (Moore (1978); Frew (1981) ). The market value of permits represents a pure rent, (one which accrues not necessarily to the current permit holders but rather to the happy few who were first issued the valuable permits without having had to pay for them). The prices at which permits were transferred were reported to the US regulatory authorities, and therefore became a matter of public record subject to the scrutiny of economists and others.
There exists evidence that trucking permits in Japan too have been traded, and hold a market value which is the capitalization of rent. But unlike the US case, the prices at which permits have been traded are not at all a matter of public record. Murao (1982; table 7-18, p. 323) Murao (p. 110) suggests that the majority of these instances were the result of mergers or bankruptcies which also epitomizes the sale of truck licenses under the US regulatory regime. Unfortunately, the prices at which these licenses were transferred was apparently not reported to the MOT.
But the fact that these transfers occurred at all evidences the market value of the licenses. Why bother obtaining a license from its current holder rather than obtaining one gratis from the MOT unless the latter avenue was thwarted?
A further hint of the market for trucking licenses in Japan is an item from a trade publication. Okano (1979, p. 76) The cost functions we estimate here are of the following sort:
where c=cost per firm, y=output per firm, t=characteristics of output, and w= a vector of factor prices. Output y is defined as metric tons shipped. Of course a given increment of output defined in this way encompasses heterogeneous activities. Accordingly, we shall suppose that the costs of "output" depend also on additional characteristics of the transport process: t,=metric tons per truckday, and t 2 =kilometers under load per truck-day. For given output as defined here, these two desiderata fairly narrowly circumscribe the number of trips per day, the average distance per haul, and the average weight per load, none of which were observed directly. The specific form we estimate is the following 7 :
Unfortunately the break occurs with the change in regulations. After 1990 the MOT ceased reporting cost data on firms in the separate categories of route trucking and area trucking as it did before.
where the a T are time effects, and the a F are firm-type effects (Firm types are distinguished by geographic region in the case of area trucks and by truck fleet size in the case of route trucks). The coefficient k (=dln c/dln y), known as the cost "flexibility", indicates the degree of scale economies in production (If X>1 there exist diseconomies of scale, and if A.<1 there are economies of scale).
We follow a standard procedure and estimate the cost function jointly with factor share equations, derived by applying Shephard's lemma to the cost function 8 :
The fact that cost shares sum to one causes the system to be overdetermined. To state the point a little differently, if we estimate the system with one of the cost share equations removed; the remaining one is uniquely determined. The firm-type effects were insignificant in the route truckers' costs, which is a further indication that scale economies are not present for these firms.
Area truckers in Osaka and Tokyo exhibit higher costs than others. Perhaps these higher costs are related in some way to the urban density of these regions.
The year dummies might be informative regarding technical change, and, in the case of area truckers, informative also regarding the effects on costs of regulatory changes adopted in 1990. First, consider technical change. There does not appear to be reflected in the data).
In the case of area trucking firms, year dummies for 1991-1993 would pick up shifts in cost due to the changes beginning in 1991 permitting area truckers for the first time to consolidate the cargoes of differing customers. There is no dramatic shift apparent.
This investigation of trucking cost functions has revealed an industry in which firms do not exhibit scale economies, and in which for the great mass of firms little cost-reducing innovation is apparent over the previous decade.
Armed with these findings, we return our attention to the effects of regulation in this industry.
9 Our estimates can be compared with those of Chiba. In Chiba (1988) he constructed a divisia index of route trucking input prices 1971 -1985 , and in Chiba (1991 used this to estimate a simple translog cost function with output represented by tons shipped by the industry in each year.
Chiba did find economies of scale (cost flexibility equalling about .5), but his estimate relies upon a much smaller sample than ours and he did not control for characteristics of output. Trade Commission investigated and learned that the truck associations of Nagano and Hiroshima prefectures had also engaged in similar behavior. All were found to have violated antimonopoly laws and agreed to desist (Takimoto (1993), pp.184-189) .
Here is yet further evidence that price regulation has been ineffective in the truck transport industry.
We can now understand that the difficulties Yamato experienced in expanding these began marketing products directly to consumers to increase the demand for their parcel service (Saitou (1993, pp. 100-106) . As the parcel delivery service expanded, the distorting effects of regulation grew larger. As Yamato and others sought to establish nationwide logistical networks, route licenses in selected areas became valuable. The firms were prepared to offer door-to-door pickup and delivery service, utilizing wireless communication with drivers, but were constrained to follow set routes with predefined dropsites. And as customers learned of the convenience and cheapness of parcel service the regulatory distortions were becoming visible. Becker (1983) has cogently argued that deadweight losses from government policies have precisely the same effects as taxes on political pressure in support of the policies. By superior facility at political organization or effective rhetoric a pressure group may overcome the disadvantage which deadweight losses impose upon it, but without such a boost it is unlikely to prevail. Symmetrically, a pressure group in favor of a policy that eliminates a deadweight loss holds an inherent political advantage, which opposing factions must overcome if they are to thwart it. The relaxation of constraints on parcel delivery service relatively soon after its initial growth spurt eliminated deadweight losses which were growing and widely visible, and should therefore be regarded as unsurprising in light of Becker's theory. But the 1989 Motor Vehicle Act contained other provisions besides those strictly related to parcel delivery service. To understand why, another theory is helpful. Peltzman (1979) developed some of the comparative static properties of political equilibrium. If a political decisionmaker is viewed as maximizing the intensity of support from all pressure groups, then rather than favoring one group to the exclusion of others it will spread rents among them, eliciting equal marginal increases in political support per dollar conferred on each. If a change in external circumstances confers additional possibility of government largess, then policies will be enacted that benefit the many rather than the few.
In the opposite case, losses will be subdivided rather than concentrated. The relaxation of constraints on parcel delivery service eliminated deadweight losses. Parcel delivery firms experienced profits and as they expanded and pushed down prices, consumers benefitted. But the 1989 law also relaxed a constraint on area truckers, unnecessary to the freeing of parcel delivery service. Area truckers were enabled to take on less-than-truckload cargoes. (But we were unable to detect any shift in cost functions resulting form this, nor has their been any striking increase in metric-tons per truck day nor reduction in kilometers under load per truck-day for area truckers (See table 8a and 8b)).
Additionally, by establishing minimum truck fleet sizes (owned and not leased) and other such preconditions for issuance of a permit the 1989 at least held the possibility of hardened entry requirements in area trucking. In particular this assured area truckers that the prohibition on private truckers from engaging in commercial business would be perpetuated, to the benefit of commercial truckers and detriment of consumers who would continue to suffer from inefficient organization of the trucking industry. As Peltzman's argument requires, the regulations were changed in a way to benefit the many.
Conclusion.
There is little to suggest that the standard price schedules which the MOT continues to publicize and periodically revise are anything more than 
